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‘Folk psychology’ has become one of the central terms in contemporary phi-
losophy of mind. In the 1980s, it had a wide currency in discussions about
functionalism and eliminativism, and it has come to play a signicant role
in the study of mindreading or howwemake sense of people’s minds. Oen,
‘folk psychology’ has been used to speak of our commonsense understand-
ing of the mind and of mental states, an understanding that implicates the
existence of a framework of concepts that we use to make sense of people’s
actions. Sometimes a stronger assumption is made; namely, that folk psy-
chology is a kind of theory that xes the meaning of mental terms, which
then turn out to be theoretical terms. Moreover, some philosophers and psy-
chologists assume that our implicit grasp of folk psychology is the very thing
thatmakes social cognition possible. Whenwe suppose that folk psychology
plays some such fundamental role, what does that tell us about the concepts
of mind and of mental states? Can we view mental states as folk psychologi-
cal posits? Are there aspects of mind that extend beyond the purview of folk
psychology?
e current issue is dedicated to topics related to folk psychology, mind-
reading and mental states. As folk psychology itself is a multifaceted phe-
nomenon, the papers cover quite a broad area. e main portion of this
introduction focuses on precisely the issue of the relationship between folk
psychology and our notion of the mind. I clarify certain pertinent back-
ground assumptions and develop my own stance towards them.e setting
that this introduction provides to the following papers is thus partial, in both
senses of the term: it is not completely neutral nor does it aim to give a com-
plete outline of the eld. I hope to remedy this with an overview of each
contribution in the last part of this introduction.
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2 Mind and Folk Psychology: A Partial Introduction
1. e folk and the mental: Two assumptions
Given the widespread use of the term ‘folk psychology,’ it should not come as
a surprise that it has been used in various dierent, albeit related, senses. It
should also go without saying that those dierent senses come with varying
commitments.
In the weakest sense, one can say that folk psychology is just the practice
of attributing mental states to other people. Somewhat more substantially,
‘folk psychology’ can be taken to mean the ability to understand others’ be-
havior in terms of mental states. Imputing the ability is more specic and
demanding than simply pointing to an existing practice. To say that one has
an ability is to make a claim about one’s competence, which may be there
even if it does not manifest itself in one’s behavior. In addition, a single prac-
tice could be subserved by various dierent abilities.ird, ‘folk psychology’
mightmeanmerely the commonsense conceptual framework that comprises
thementalistic terms used in the folk practice. Further, the frameworkmight
also be said to contain commonsense principles and generalizations, all ei-
ther implicitly known or constructed from an external, philosophical van-
tage point. e rst option corresponds to the theory-theory (an empiri-
cal hypothesis about our actual mindreading mechanism) and the other to
the David Lewis’s (1972) construal of functionalism.1 One could add even
more padding to the notion and talk about folk psychology as a theory that
has rich “Fodorian” commitments; such as representationalism, causation
by content, Language ofought etc. (as pointed out by Lycan 1997, 2–3).
Evidently some grouping of these dierent senses is needed if we are
to keep our bearings in the midst of their diversity. It is important to dis-
tinguish the phenomenon from the explanation of the phenomenon. Both
Daniel F. Hartner and Taavi Laanpere in their contributions to the present
issue make a distinction of this sort. Laanpere distinguishes between the ex-
planandum and explanans with regard to folk psychology. Hartner draws a
line between the target phenomenon and the mechanism that is postulated
to explain it. Proceeding from this distinction, the practice of mindreading,
as well as the framework of concepts it employs, belong to the side of target
phenomena, whereas the claims thatmindreading is achieved by the applica-
tion of some single ability, or by an implicit theory ofmind or or by processes
of mental simulation should be seen as explications of the mechanism that
gives rise to the target phenomena.
Let me illustrate just how diverse the senses of ‘folk psychology’ are by
walking through some of theways inwhich philosophersworking in the area
1 Stephen Stich and Ian Ravenscro label the rst one “internal” and the second as the “ex-
ternal” reading of ‘folk psychology’ (see Stich 1996, 124–131).
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have dened the term. I begin with a retrospective quote by Daniel Dennett
who claims authorship of the term, dating its conception to 1981 (seeDennett
1981). Although future historians of the philosophy of mind will, no doubt,
sort this matter out, let me just note that in the same year the term also
gured prominently in Paul Churchland’s (1981) now classic eliminativist
paper.2 Dennett conceives of folk psychology as an ability to interpret action
in terms of beliefs anddesires andhe distinguishes this clearly from the claim
that the ability involves a theory:
Probably the most important pattern in our manifest image, because
it anchors so many other categories that matter to us, is the pattern
I call folk psychology. I coined the term in its current meaning in
1981, but it apparently had an earlier incarnation in the writings of
Wilhelm Wundt and Sigmund Freud and others (Volkpsychologie),
where it meant something about national character (the Geist of the
German Volk—you do not want to know). is was an antecedent I
had missed, as did many others who adopted the term. I proposed
folk psychology as a term for the talent we all have for interpreting
the people around us—and the animals and the robots and even the
lowly thermostats—as agents with information about the world they
act in (beliefs) and the goals (desires) they strive to achieve, choosing
the most reasonable course of action, given their beliefs and desires.
. . . Since everybody agrees that we have the interpretive talent, and ev-
erybody does not agree about how we manage to be so competent, I
think it is best to keep ‘theory’ out of it and to use a somewhat more
neutral term for the time being. . . .Folk psychology is a talent we excel
in without formal education. (Dennett 2013, 73–74)
e following is Paul Chuchland’s resolute construal of folk psychology as a
tacitly known and theoretical body of knowledge that contains laws for the
explanation and prediction of behavior:
e fact is that the average person is able to explain, and even predict,
the behavior of other persons with a facility and success that is re-
markable. Such explanations and predictions standardly make refer-
ence to the desires, beliefs, fears, intentions, perceptions, and so forth,
to which the agents are presumed subject. But explanations presup-
pose laws—rough and ready ones, at least—that connect the explana-
tory conditions with the behavior explained.e same is true for the
making of predictions, and for the justication of subjunctive and
counterfactual conditional concerning behavior. Reassuringly, a rich
network of common-sense laws can indeed be reconstructed from
2 e term ’folk psychology’ is also included to the index of Churchland’s (1979) book,
whereas in the text he talks about “the P-theory”. He acknowledges his debt to Sellars
(1956) for the idea that our commonsense conception of the mind is theoretical.
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this quotidean commerce of explanation and anticipation; its princi-
ples are familiar homilies; and their sundry functions are transparent.
Each of us understands others, as well as we do, because we share a
tacit command of an integrated body of lore concerning the lawlike
relations holding among external circumstances, internal states, and
overt behavior. Given its nature and functions, this body of lore may
quite aptly be called ‘folk psychology.’ (Churchland 1981, 68–69)
Circa 15 years later he still understands folk psychology as a framework for
predicting and explaining behavior. Note—and this will be important later
on—how he presumes that the framework includes mental concepts:
‘Folk psychology’ denotes the prescientic, common-sense concep-
tual framework that all normally socialized humans deploy in order
to comprehend, predict, explain, andmanipulate the behaviour of hu-
mans and the higher animals.is framework includes concepts such
as belief, desire, pain, pleasure, love, hate, joy, fear, suspicion,memory,
recognition, anger, sympathy, intention, and so forth. (Churchland
1994, 308)
Stephen Stich also lists familiarmental terms and claims that folk psychology
is a theory that regulates their use:
In our everyday dealingswith one anotherwe invoke a variety of com-
monsense psychological terms including ‘believe’, ‘remember’, ‘feel’,
‘thinking’, ‘desire’, ‘prefer’, ‘imagine’, ‘fear’, andmany others.e use of
these terms is governed by a loose knit network of largely tacit prin-
ciples, platitudes, and paradigms which constitute a folk theory. Fol-
lowing recent practice, I will call this network folk psychology. (Stich
1983, 1)
Nichols and Stich (2003) make a stronger claim when they say that folk psy-
chological information is actually put to use by internal mindreading mech-
anisms:
[T]he most natural interpretation, for both functionalists and elimi-
nativists, is that folk psychology is a rich body of information about
the mind that is utilized by the mental mechanisms responsible for
mindreading. (Nichols and Stich 2003, 8, italics omitted)
More recently, Daniel Hutto denes folk psychology as a practice, but then
moves swily to characterize it as an ability to use mental predicates:
Folk psychology (or FP) is a moniker devised by philosophers which
is meant to designate a specic sub-section of our everyday talk of,
and thought about, the mental. . .When used in an appropriately re-
stricted sense, FP denotes—at a bare minimum—our everyday prac-
tice of making sense of intentional actions (i.e. our own and those of
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others) in terms of reasons, where this implies having a capacity for
the competent invocation of propositional attitude talk. So construed,
FP . . . is a sophisticated, high level capacity; it involves being able to
answer a particular sort of ‘why’-question by skilfully deploying the
idiom of mental predicates (beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, etc.). (Hutto
2009a, 10)
Given the variety of senses, it is important to be clear which notion one pre-
sumes when talking about ‘folk psychology’; otherwise there is a danger of
a mere verbal disagreement.3 So let me be clear in this regard: for the pur-
poses of this introduction, I will understand ‘folk psychology’ primarily in
the sense of a conceptual framework that includes certain familiar psycho-
logical terms as well as the links between them.4 Of course, this framework
is put to practical use when we attribute mental states to others in order
to make sense of their action, and this presumes a certain ability or set of
abilities to apply the framework. e ‘ability’ and ‘practice’ senses of ‘folk
psychology’ are thus related to the ‘framework’ sense, but they will not be in
the foreground in what follows.is sort of usage is quite widespread, when
people aim to include only relativelymodest commitments in their interpre-
tation of ‘folk psychology’ (e.g., Goldman 1993, 15; Von Eckhardt 1994, 300).
e stronger and more controversial commitments (such as that the links
in the framework constitute rules, principles or laws or empirical claims on
the level of amechanism that this framework is internally represented or has
the form of a theory) need not be part of the ‘framework’ sense of ‘folk psy-
chology.’ is sense is also independent of the oen presupposed view that
the sole purpose of the framework is to explain and predict behavior.ere
are many other uses to which it can be put (Wilkes 1991, 25). Nor does the
‘framework’ sense commit us to the view that, when used descriptively, folk
psychological descriptions should be read in a “realist” way.
An understanding of ‘folk psychology’ as a conceptual frameworkmight
be relatively modest compared to some other uses of this term, but such an
3 Two recent books on folk psychology agree with each other quite substantially when they
each claim that attributing propositional attitudes is neither the only, nor the most central,
way of making sense of others. However, they draw almost completely opposite conclu-
sions. I think this is partly due to what they read into the notion. Kristin Andrews (2012,
7) takes ‘folk psychology’ to denote “nothing more than the commonsense understanding
of otherminds,” and so she can be a pluralist about folk psychology while pointing out that
the commonsense understanding is much richer than usually assumed. Matthew Ratclie
proceeds from a rather loaded notion of folk psychology, understood as the attribution
of propositional attitudes and he ends up advocating eliminativism about folk psychol-
ogy because he takes it to be too narrow and a misleading philosophical construction of
commonsense understanding (see Ratclie 2007, 224).
4 I presume that terms express concepts and for the sake of simplicity ignore the dierences
between terms and concepts.
6 Mind and Folk Psychology: A Partial Introduction
understanding is far from innocent. It seems that in this way the locution
‘usage of folk psychology’ has come to mean ‘speaking in terms of mental
states’ (or ‘the mentalistic vocabulary’ as it is sometimes called). I hope that
the reader excuses some further quotations, so that I may demonstrate that
there is indeed such a tendency:
[F]olk psychology. . . is the perspective that invokes the family of ‘men-
talistic’ concepts, such as belief, desire, knowledge, fear, pain, expec-
tation, intention, understanding, dreaming, imagination, self-con-
sciousness, and so on. (Dennett 1987, 7)
By ‘folk psychology’ I mean the commonsense understanding and
deployment of mentalistic concepts, especially the propositional at-
titudes. (Goldman 2000, 4)
Folk psychological explanations proceed by calling upon a common
stock of familiarmental terms, which are deployed in systematicways.
In line with this, mentalistic vocabulary is generally regarded to be
a kind of well-regimented and clearly demarcated domain that can
be identied by its own specic set of rules. At its heart, we nd
intentional attitude psychology, which is—crucially—a kind of be-
lief/desire psychology. (Hutto 2009b, 203)
us, to deploy folk psychology is to use mental terms. But which terms
are mental? One (and perhaps an obvious) way to answer this question
is to take seriously the idea that folk psychology constitutes a framework.
Folk psychology is not just a random collection of mental terms—being a
framework means that it also determines what belongs to this collection.
In other words, folk psychology can be understood as something that set-
tles which states are mental and which are not. Although this idea can be
paired with the view that terms belonging to folk psychology are implicitly
dened within it, just as theoretical terms are implicitly dened in a the-
ory, the pairing is not obligatory. It is sucient if there are conceptual con-
nections between the elements in the framework, so that anything that is
not interconnected in the relevant way is not part of the folk psychological
framework. Of course, some links point also to environmental and behav-
ioral conditions, so the framework is not isolated from the world. But these
“external” conditions are not part of the framework itself. With these con-
nections and links in the background, we can then understand and identify
each member of the framework. In this sense we can say that mental states
are individuated through the folk psychological framework. Let us call this
‘e Folk Assumption’:
e Folk Assumption: Mental states are individuated through
folk psychology.
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In calling this ‘an assumption’ I aim to stress that this idea has the status
of a tacit or implicit premise. It may not have been explicitly articulated
by anyone in this way, but something like this seems to guide at least some
philosophical discussions of folk psychology.
Another similarly tacit assumption can be constructed out ofwidespread
talk aboutmental stateswhendiscussingmatters of themind. Oen thismay
just be for the sake of simplicity, but taken literally, this becomes a substan-
tial claim that can implicitly shape philosophical analysis.5 So let us make
this one explicit too. According to this assumption, the mind is just a collec-
tion of mental states (e.g., beliefs, experiences, desires, thoughts, etc.). Brain
states, bodily states and anything that cannot be construed as mental states
are not part of the mind.
eMentalist Assumption: themind is solely composed ofmen-
tal states.
When we combine these two assumptions, they yield a position that can be
called ‘e Folk-Mentalistesis’:
e Folk-Mentalistesis (FMT): the mind is solely composed
of mental states as individuated through folk psychology.
Aswe can see, this ties the notion of themind very intimately to folk psychol-
ogy. Bymaking this position explicit, even if it is one that nobody has openly
subscribed to, we can subject it to criticism and, if needed, then improve or
reject it. Insofar it has been tacitly informing philosophical analyses, the
upshot of such criticism is relevant for such analyses as well.
2. e Folk-Mentalistesis and the scope of folk psychology
Is the Folk-Mentalistesis tenable? In what follows, I bring out two possi-
ble and related concerns about FMT.
e rst worry is related to an uneasy methodological consequence that
can be drawn from FMT. If the mind is composed of nothing else but folk
psychological states, then it is natural to think that the mind can be fully un-
derstood merely by investigating folk psychology. Or, more modestly, even
if one builds up only a philosophical conception of the mind based on folk
psychology, it would still remain isolated from other sciences (such as psy-
chology or neuroscience) that also claim to be relevant to our understanding
of the mind. Although it can be argued that the folk psychological concep-
tion of the mind serves dierent, non-explanatory aims or has some other
5 (Steward 1997) is one rare example of an eort to pay heed to the “statehood” of mental
states and to distinguish them from mental events.
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features that ground its autonomy, it is hard to deny the relevance of scientic
psychology and neuroscience. If so, there is the question of how scientic
explanations relate to the folk psychological conception if the latter stands
alone in isolation. (For more on the relationship between psychological and
folk psychological explanations and on the autonomy of folk psychology, see
(Bermúdez 2005) and Laanpere’s paper in this issue.)
Second, even if we leave out these worries concerning isolation, there is
still the question of whether folk psychology can capture the whole mind. If
‘folk psychology’ is another name for the set of mental terms, then the lim-
its of folk psychology are also the limits of the mental. However, this seems
too narrow. For there appear to be several phenomena that are related to
the mind but which do not t into the picture if FMT holds. e follow-
ing is an open-ended list of such phenomena, which are at least prima facie
troublesome for FMT:
(a) e processes happening at very short time-scales (up to hundreds
of milliseconds) in which the usual conceptual distinctions of folk
psychology do not apply. For example, Dennett (1991) has made an
interesting case for the claim that at such time-scales one cannot
distinguish between memory and experience and I think that this
point can also be maintained independently of his multiple dras
model of consciousness. Presumably, we need then some new terms
to describe the early stages of consciousness (see also (d)).
(b) e pre-linguistic states and processes that occur at an early stage
in human development, especially in relation to other persons (e.g.,
mother-child reciprocity), labeled “primary intersubjectivity” by
Trevarthen (1979).
(c) e intersubjective processes through which we understand other
people that involve some kind of direct attunement to others (e.g.,
Gallagher 2008a).ese are usually not described in terms of men-
tal states, but rather with terms such as ‘resonance’ (Goldman 2008)
or ‘mirroring’ (Gallese 2001).
(d) Certain psychological structures that underpin our conscious phe-
nomenology (for example, the tripartite (retention-primal impres-
sion-protention) structure of time consciousness proposed byHuss-
erl 1991) or other features of consciousness that cannot be character-
ized as mental states, strictly speaking (e.g., the unity of conscious-
ness (Dainton 2006), or the aordance of certain situations).6
6 For an example of aordance, the description of which is not given in terms of mental
states causing action, see (Dreyfus and Kelly 2007, 52).
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ese are some examples of mental phenomena that folk psychology does
not seem to capture.7 If it does not (and I do not see how these phenomena
are part and parcel of folk psychology as it is usually understood), then FMT
would seem to be inadequate.8
At this point, the defender of folk psychology could object that the listed
items are not really mental phenomena. And if they are not, then it is no ob-
jection that these are not part of our folk psychology. On the contrary, this is
something to be expected if folk psychology circumscribes what is mental.
Moreover, some of the above examples involve the terms that psychologists
use to explain cognition, and that is not a purpose of the commonsense con-
ception of the mind.
In response to this it should be remembered that experiences aremental.
More precisely, there seems to be a sucient experiential condition for be-
ing mental: a phenomenon is mental if having it is experiencing something.
All of the listed phenomena are related to experience: they are either ex-
periential processes or psychological structures that constitute experiences.
Whether this conicts with a folk-psychological criterion (one which takes
a phenomenon to bemental when that phenomenon is individuated in folk-
psychological terms), depends upon whether folk psychology includes ex-
perience. If it does, then the experiential condition is subsumed under a folk
psychological criterion. Given this, the defender of folk psychology cannot
say that these are not mental phenomena. Only when folk psychology is
understood very narrowly as propositional attitude psychology would these
criteria yield dierent results. But then it could be argued that there must be
multiple sucient criteria for the mental: it is sucient for a phenomenon
to be regarded as mental if either the folk psychological or the experiential
criterion holds of it.
is explains why we can regard the listed phenomena as mental, but
they would still be troublesome for FMT. From the folk psychological point
of view, one can refer to them only vaguely as something experiential. More
detailed specications of them are couched in terms that go beyond com-
monsense. However, as noted, it would be wrong to conclude from this that
descriptions in these terms are not about the mind. Explorations of these
7 Could the possibility of extended cognition (Clark and Chalmers 1998) be an additional
stumbling-block for FMT? No. is possibility is orthogonal to the present discussion, as
the Mentalist Assumption would hold even if cognitive states are realized by extracranial
processes.
8 My objections to FMT here may remind one of a criticism of folk psychology by Church-
land (1981), who—among other things—argued that folk psychology is inadequate as an
explanatory theory, since it does not explainmental illnesses, learning, creativity, the func-
tion of sleep, memory, perceptual illusions and vision. However, I am not inclined to draw
eliminativist conclusions from my objections.
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phenomena within phenomenology, psychology and neuroscience are rele-
vant, for they can be viewed as targeting the processes that constitute expe-
riences.
3. Folk psychology extended
Let us assume that the criticism of FMT outlined in the previous section
holds. What tomake of it? One optionwould be to dethrone folk psychology
from its putative central position both in our conception of the mental and
in the explanation of social cognition (for proposals in this direction see
Ratclie 2007; Gauker 2003 and Morton 2003). Here, however, I would like
to briey explore a more conservative option that retains the central role of
folk psychology, but extends its scope.
I begin with the observation that although it is a routine practice, there
is no obligation to construe folk psychology narrowly as a framework of be-
liefs, desires, thoughts and memories. It can encompass much more. Folk
psychology can be taken to incorporate pertinent contributions from sci-
entic psychology and neuroscience, and it could also include those listed
phenomena that did not t into folk psychology narrowly construed. Let us
dub the extended version of folk psychology ‘folk psychology 2.0.’e tradi-
tional construal of folk psychology (as discussed above) would be then folk
psychology 1.0. e candidates for a new vocabulary could include terms
like ‘resonance,’ ‘integration,’ ‘aordance’: they can be considered part of folk
psychology 2.0 if they become suciently integrated into the existing (and
gradually extending) folk framework.9
Another example could be a philosopher’s proposed addition to our ex-
isting taxonomy, critically discussed inompson’s paper in this issue: the
concept of alief suggested by Tamar Gendler (2008), an associative and ha-
bitual response disposition that is loaded with aect and leads to action.
Of course, I do not mean to imply that any suggested new taxonomic item
should be automatically incorporated into extended folk psychology. e
merits of each case should be considered individually and the grounds for
deciding whether a given proposal is useful still need working out. Research
on particular kinds of such (putatively) mental phenomena is very useful in
this regard. e studies of shared emotions by Bohl and pain by Kim et al.
in the current issue are cases in point.
Although it is important to reect on the conditions under which folk
psychology could be extended, I am inclined to think that there are no clear-
9 e terms of folk psychology 2.0 could thus also come from so-called ‘subpersonal-level’
accounts.ere is a tendency to equate folk psychological talk with a personal-level story,
though there can also be links to the subpersonal. (For the personal-subpersonal distinc-
tion, see Dennett 1969.
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cut facts of the matter about whether any new addition will really belong to
extended folk psychology or not. Peter Godfrey-Smith nicely expresses a
similar attitude in his statement on the status of ‘belief ’ when moving, in
the opposite direction, from folk psychology to scientic psychology:
Imagine . . . a theory recognizing the core structural contrast between
belief and desire, but embedding this contrast within a detailed pic-
ture that departs in many ways from folk psychology. . . . Some cogni-
tive scientists will want to retain folk-psychological terms like ‘belief ’
for the states that are posited and described in this process; others
may want to avoid these terms. To retain the term ‘belief ’ is to stress
the continuities between the scientic model and the folk psycholog-
ical model, with respect to the basic interaction between ‘how things
are’ and ‘what I want’ states. To drop the term is to stress the disconti-
nuities between the scientic and the folk psychological picture. But
there is no fact of the matter about whether the psychological states
that appear in such a psychology ‘really are beliefs’—whether they are
the same states posited by folk psychology but more accurately de-
scribed. . .ere is no fact of the matter because folk psychology itself
does not commit to a suciently denite specication of what beliefs
are supposed to be like. (Godfrey-Smith 2004, 156–157)
Likewise, whether the extended framework still deserves the name ‘folk psy-
chology’ depends upon whether there are enough continuities between the
old and the extended framework, and whether these are important enough.
I think that there are and that they are—but this is a pragmatic and not a
factual matter.
Let me alleviate a possible worry. It has oen been emphasized that folk
psychology has a normative nature and that folk psychological stories are
used to justify, evaluate and regulate behavior (Braaten 1988; McGeer 2007;
Andrews 2015). According to this view, beliefs, desires and other folk psy-
chology 1.0 states have various normative connections to each other. e
new terms of folk psychology 2.0 are not part of this network, and when
added, they would not be properly integrated (as far as normativity is con-
cerned). In contrast to this, I think that the normativity of the folk psycho-
logical framework is not the crucial factor here. What matters is that the
new terms will be connected to the old framework. Folk psychology 2.0 will
come into eect when the new vocabulary is linked to other folk terms. If
such links can be forged, they will acquire a normative import too.
Onemight wonder if this proposal predicts that the new vocabulary will
be part of our everyday talk. To answer this question, we need to remem-
ber that folk psychology as a conceptual framework should not oat free
from folk psychological practice—the practice of understanding minds in
folk psychological terms. Of course, the practice is not xed and static and
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it develops over time. One should also distinguish between the folk psychol-
ogy that people actually use and the philosophical portrayal of folk psychol-
ogy. What has been expressed in the quotes I have listed here is inescapably
the philosophical portrayal—the way the philosophers construe folk psy-
chology. In other words, one could say that the philosophical portrayal gives
an explicit description of people’s implicit knowledge or conceptual ability
that normally manifests itself in the practice. Folk psychology 2.0 is a kind
of philosophical portrayal in this sense also.10 All I have suggested is that it
might be a better description of the (evolving) practice than the traditional
philosophical account of folk psychology (what I nicknamed ‘folk psychol-
ogy 1.0’).e proposal I am considering here is to update the philosophical
construal of folk psychology. As such, it does not take a stand on the way
people speak. Any possible change in ways of speaking depends upon just
how widely the new vocabulary becomes explicitly known.11 It also depends
on whether people would have a need to talk about those things in everyday
life. However, whatmatters is what vocabulary they would use if such a need
were to arise.
In sum, the proposal is to update the Folk Assumption in the following
way:
e Revised Folk Assumption: Mental states are individuated
through folk psychology 2.0.
By thus opening up folk psychology to inputs from science and philosophy,
we can relieve the “isolation”worry. In order to cure the narrow-mindedness
of FMT, the Mentalist Assumption needs revision too. Fortunately, there is
an easy and obvious x. Instead of onlymental states, all mental phenomena
(states, properties, events and processes) should be included.
e RevisedMentalist Assumption:emind is solely composed
of mental phenomena.
Giving up this version of the Mentalist Assumption would result in the
strange view that the mind can be also composed of non-mental phenom-
ena. So let us keep it. By conjoining these two revised assumptions, we get
the revised FMT:
10 Note that folk psychology 2.0 is not “regimented” folk psychology, i.e., folk psychology
idealized for scientic purposes (like the intentional system theory of Dennett 1987). e
latter would be folk psychology narrowed, not extended.
11 e vocabulary of psychoanalysis could be seen as an example of specialist psychological
vocabulary entering that of the masses (cf. Arminjon 2013). But in that case I would not
claim that psychoanalytic vocabulary made an existing implicit understanding explicit. It
rather shaped the path for a new conception of mental processes.
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e Revised Folk-Mentalistesis:e mind is solely composed
of mental phenomena as individuated through folk psychology
2.0
is revised thesis allows us to incorporate the above-mentioned phenom-
ena into the mind—phenomena which were troublesome for the original
FMT. For they could be part of folk psychology 2.0, and they can still be
regarded as phenomena if they are not states.
I will close this section with a remark on the relationship betweenmind-
reading and folk psychology, as I have discussed the latter here. Assuming
that ‘mindreading’ means the understanding of others in terms of mental
states, and assuming that folk psychology is a framework for mental states,
does it follow that we only understand others in terms of folk psychology?
e view that understanding others is only amatter ofmindreading or “men-
talizing” has recently been criticized by many authors (Gallagher 2001; Ber-
múdez 2003; Gauker 2003; Ratclie 2007; Andrews 2012). For example, An-
drews (2015, 51) points out that besides mindreading, “we understand others
in terms of individual properties such as personality traits and generaliza-
tions from past behavior, and in terms of group properties such as stereo-
types and social norms.”
I do not think that such a conclusion follows. We can distinguish mind-
reading from social cognition broadly speaking. Understanding others in
terms of mental states is just one way of understanding other people and
their actions. Very oen we get by with others without thinking about their
minds or attributing mental states to them. ere is denitely no need to
equate the application of folk psychology with social cognition. Even if we
take ‘folk psychology’ in the extended sense, not all varieties of social cog-
nition (such as those that rely upon stereotypes, inductive behavioral gen-
eralizations or shared social norms, etc.), should be included in this, as they
also concern non-mental phenomena. ese means of understanding oth-
ers should count as examples of non-mentalistic social cognition. us, on
the present proposal, we can say that mindreading is accomplished by using
folk psychology 2.0, but this is not all there is to social cognition.12
12 is proposal is thusmore restrictive thanAndrew’s “pluralistic folk psychology” as she ba-
sically equals commonsense social cognition to folk psychology. Applying folk psychology
2.0 would be just one method amongst others (see Andrews 2015, 53–54). is dierence
can partly be explained by the fact that I am proceeding from the ‘mentalistic framework’
reading of folk psychology, whereas Andrews assumes that folk psychology is what is im-
plicated in reading other people, not just their minds.
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4. Overview of papers
e above exploration of the link between folk psychology and the mind
could not do justice to all of the topics addressed by the papers in this is-
sue, as their range is quite wide, touching also upon such matters as self-
knowledge, pre-linguistic understanding of others, normativity, infant and
chimpanzeemindreading, pain and emotions. In what follows, I give a short
overview of each paper, while also drawing attention to some connections
between them.
Daniel Hartner presents a careful analysis of the term ‘folk psychology,’
which he uses to refer both to people’s mindreading activity and to their lin-
guistic description of this activity. He warns against ve conations in the
study of folk psychology: a) assuming that the concepts people use when
reading minds are fully captured by the folk terms that gure in ‘folk psy-
chology’ understood as a linguistic description; b) replacing the phenome-
non that needs to be explained (mindreading) with a mechanism that pro-
vides just one possible explanation (the theory-theory); c) not distinguishing
between a mechanism of mindreading (e.g., the theory-theory) and a philo-
sophical theory about the nature of folkmental states (functionalism); d) not
distinguishing between a theory of how mindreading actually works and a
possible account of mind that could be constructed from folk psychology
(e.g., the analysis of mental states as propositional attitudes).e root cause
of these conations, according to Hartner, is the “methodological problem”
that our internal perspective (quamindreaders) confounds our external per-
spective (qua the researchers of mindreaders). As researchers, we have no
other linguistic framework for studying our actual mindreading activities
than the lay language of folk psychology. He suggests that this methodolog-
ical peculiarity gives psychology a kind of autonomy with respect to more
fundamental sciences like neuroscience. But this is nothing to celebrate, as,
for Hartner, this means that psychology is unable to study what the mind is
really like. It rather describes the mind in terms of our folk psychological
framework.
Taavi Laanpere also starts out by distinguishing between dierent senses
of ‘folk psychology.’ Proceeding from the notion of folk psychology as a set
of mental concepts, he focuses on the autonomy of explanations couched in
folk psychological vocabulary. Such autonomy is oen based on the idea that
the ascription ofmental states relies upon normative principles of rationality
and thus are normative themselves as a result—they incorporate commit-
ments about how one ought to act. is is supposed to make such explana-
tions immune to revisions from causal explanations couched in subpersonal
terms. Laanpere argues against thismove by pointing out that several propo-
sitional attitude concepts are in fact normatively indistinguishable. If they
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do not make a unique normative contribution to a subject’s “rational pro-
le,” then their distinctness lies elsewhere, in their descriptive content. But
there are no obstacles impeding the entrance of such contents into causal
explanations or their appearance within subpersonal-level statements. He
concludes that the autonomy of folk psychology cannot be founded upon
normative considerations.
J. Robert ompson addresses the issue of adding new informational
mental states to the psychological taxonomy. By the latter, he does not mean
a folk-psychological taxonomy, but a (philosophically) regimented taxon-
omy of psychological states that stems from the familiar folk notions. e
apparent need to expand the psychological taxonomy is suggested by cer-
tain puzzling phenomena such as delusions, addiction, blindsight and cases
in which one’s self-avowed beliefs conict with one’s actions. Inompson’s
view, the psychological taxonomy need not be expanded by postulating new
informational states, for the puzzling phenomena can be explained in terms
of subdoxastic states and beliefs; especially when we recognize that there are
various doxastic or belief-like states. In particular,ompson focuses upon
the question of whether we need to add “aliefs” to the psychological tax-
onomy. Aliefs are evidence-insensitive, habitual states posited by Gendler
(2008) in which the information carried by the state is inseparable from its
action-guiding aspects. ompson argues that aliefs are not well-dened
and do not yield any explanatory advantage. us their introduction is not
justied.
What does it take to share mental states? Vivian Bohl focuses on emo-
tions, especially on infants’ positive emotions, for which Joel Krueger (2013)
has defended the “Joint Ownership esis” (JOT)—the idea that the same
episode of emotion is owned by more than one individual at the same time.
She provides a thorough criticism of JOT and outlines her own approach
to shared emotions. Bohl takes a shared emotion to be a kind of social-
relational emotion. Shared emotions arise within existing social relation-
ships and can be analyzed in terms of the relational models theory and the
dynamical systems approach. Shared emotions are understood by the par-
ticipants of the interactive episode in the light of their ongoing relationship.
Phenomenologically speaking, they have the quality of a sense of oneness—
the emotion is seen as fostering the mutual relationship. Shared emotions
cannot be maintained alone and they may arise in a synchronous manner
between people, but they would still remain individual states, in contrast to
Krueger’s idea of joint ownership.
Philosophers oen operate with their preferred construal of folk psycho-
logy. But is this in accord with the way the folk understand their states?is
is an empirical question, which in recent years has been put forward by ex-
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perimental philosophers who seek to nd out what the folk actually think.
It turns out that oen the “actual folk” dier from “philosophers’ folk”. Hyo-
eun Kim, Nina Poth, Kevin Reuter and Justin Sytsma present their empirical
studies of the ordinary concept of pain. eir aim was to see if the philoso-
phers’ common understanding of the folk concept of pain as a private and
subjective mental state can be empirically supported and whether there are
cultural dierences in the folk understanding of pain. eir studies with
American and South Korean respondents show that in contrast to the com-
mon philosophical conception, the folk conception takes pain to be a bod-
ily state. ere seem to be several bodily conceptions: one locates the pain
where the body is damaged, the other locates it in the location where pain
is felt to be (a location which can be dierent from the damaged part of
the body). No cultural dierences were found with respect to the issue of
whether pains are conceived of as mental or as bodily states. Both groups
predominantly view pains as states of the body and are divided between the
two versions of the bodily conception. However, South Koreans tend to pre-
fer the rst version of the bodily conception—the one that locates the pain
in where the body is damaged.
e following papers deal with folk psychology understood as mind-
reading and its kin. Leon de Bruin proceeds from the “mindshaping” ac-
count of folk psychology (McGeer 2007; Hutto 2008; Zawidzki 2013). Ac-
cording to the mindshaping approach, in contrast to descriptive accounts
of mindreading, folk psychology is a normative framework in the service of
shaping people’s minds and behavior in order to make them intelligible. It is
because we share this framework, and because we participate in a common
practice of shaping our minds in accordance with this framework, that the
otherwise very complex task of interpreting other people becomes feasible
(McGeer 2007). Whereas themindshaping idea is usually applied to persons
other than oneself, de Bruin inquires into whether this idea could also work
for self-knowledge. Based on McGeer’s views on “self-regulative agency,” de
Bruin applies the mindshaping approach to the rst person and conceives of
folk psychology as a practice of bringing one’s mental states, habits, avowals
and actions into line with each other, in a way that ts our social norms.
Another alternative to standard mindreading accounts is Interaction
eory (Gallagher 2001; 2008b), which states that mentalizing or the at-
tribution of beliefs and desires is quite rare in everyday social interaction.
Instead, we make sense of others by responding interactively to them and
by seeing directly in an embodied way what they are up to. Uku Tooming’s
paper deals with the status of mentalizing in the interactionist account. He
reasons as follows. Since interactionists do not deny that we sometimes at-
tribute propositional attitudes, they need to explain whywe do it if this is not
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needed for day-to-day social interaction. ey usually rely on what Toom-
ing calls the “Justicatory Role Account”: we begin to infer and attribute
beliefs and desires when the other’s behavior is irrational or violates tacitly
assumed norms. Tooming points out that this explanation does not hold
up since there are simpler justications for such cases that do not involve
the attribution of beliefs and desires. He then proposes an account of belief
and desire attribution that interactionists could resort to. is is based on
Christopher Gauker’s (2003) communicative conception. Tooming extends
this conception to communication through gesture. At the most basic level,
making belief and desire attributions then comes down to declarative and
imperative pointing on other people’s behalf.
Accounting for mindreading in infants and chimpanzees involves spe-
cial diculties. Because their performance in mindreading tasks is below
the level of advanced mindreaders, it is not obvious that it can be explained
in a mentalistic way. A mentalistic account (according to which infants and
chimpanzees understand and attributemental states to others) has been con-
tested by more minimalist non-mentalistic approaches (according to which
they either read only behavior or attribute stateswhich dier from full-blown
mental states).e last two papers in this issue deal with these themes.ey
both present an approach to basic socio-cognitive abilities that is more min-
imalist than the standard mentalistic account.
Laura Danón builds upon the suggestion by Lurz and Krachun (2011)
that chimpanzees attribute “pushmi-pullyu representations” to others. is
term comes from Millikan (1996), who uses it to designate certain primi-
tive representations in which informational and directive functions are in-
tertwined. (In this respect they are similar to the aliefs that are discussed
inompson’s paper.) Millikan has also distinguished pure pushmi-pullyu
representations from theirmore complex variants inwhich the directive part
is exercised only when further motivational states are present or where the
situation aords more than one alternative course of action. In her paper,
Danón presents a taxonomy of three types of basic mindreading, each cor-
responding to an ability to attribute a dierent kind of pushmi-pullyu repre-
sentation and discusses chimpanzee and infantmindreading in light of these
distinctions.
Marco Fenici and Tadeusz W. Zawidzki discuss infant social cognition,
focusing upon infants’ understanding of action as exhibited in spontaneous
false belief tasks. ey defend an alternative, non-mentalistic account on
which infants track short-lived bouts of behavior and relate them to external
goals and themost ecient means to those goals.ey reject thementalistic
account that takes infants to attribute mental states to the enduring minds
of other agents.
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In conclusion, let me express the hope that this volume incites further
discussions on the many facets of the mind and folk psychology.
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